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et al.: Trust Receipts--A Legislative Problem

TRUST RECEIPTS - A LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM
Trusts receipts have in recent years become a new device in
domestic trade, already vitally essential to the wholesaling of
valuable articles for quick retail turn-over. In West Virginia, as
in other jurisdictions, motor-cars and radios have compelled their
use.' The normal form of trust receipt 3 contemplates an agreement by the dealer to hold these individualized chattels "in trust"
for the manufacturer or his assignee, there being a right of sale
in the dealer once proper release of the particular chattel has been
secured. Obviously it must be binding as between the immediate
parties, 4 and it is also effective as against those who act with
knowledge of the trust arrangement.2 There is considerable doubt,
however, as to its validity against creditors and bona fide purchasers without notice." Confusion is incteased by a failure to
place trust receipts clearly in any recognized security group,

I Bogert, The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act (1935) 3 UNiV. Cm. L. REV.
26. The following articles are helpful sources of additional information:
Taylor, Trust Receipts (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 168; Frederick, The Trust Beceipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 395 and 546; Vold, Trust :eccipt
Security in Financing of Sales (1930) 25 CORN. L. Q. 521; Hanna, Trust Beceipts (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 545, Trust Receipts (1931) 39 CALiF. L. REV.
257; Notes (1927) 49 A. L. R. 282, (1933) 87 A. L. R. 302.
2 See also Note (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 269; Preston, Trust Receipt Doctrine
with Special Reference to the Decisions and Statutes of Virginia (1926) 12 VA.
L. REv. 393.
3 This device is very modern, probably first being used in the case of Barry
and Hoogewerff v. Boninger and Lehr, 46 Md. 59 (1876). It originated in
the importing business but is equally applicable to domestic transactions.
In re James, 30 F. (2d) 555 (1929). But see Simons v. Northeastern Finance
Corp., 271 Mass. 285, 171 N. E. 643 (1930).
4 Brown v. Green and Hickey Leather Co., 244 Mass. 168, 138 N. E. 714
(1923); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kline, 78 F. (2d) 618 (1935).
5 Commercial Credit Co. v. Schiegel-Storseth Motor Co., 23 S. W. (2d)
702 (1930).
6 Representative cases upholding validity against creditors on bankruptcy
include: Canal Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. New Orleans T. & M.
Ry., 161 La. 1051, 109 So. 834 (1926); In re Otto-Johnson Mercantile Co.,
52 F. (2d) 678 (1928); In re James, supra n. 3; Hamilton National Bank
v. McCallum, 58 F. (2d) 912 (1932). Contra: In re Fountain, 282 Fed. 816
(1922) ;' G. M. A. C. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928); IA re
Draughn v. Steele Motor Co., 49 F. (2d) 636 (1931); Commercial Investment
Trust Corp. v. Wilson, 58 F. (2d) 910 (1932). Validity against purchasers
and others dealing bona fide with dealer: In re Dunlay Carpet Co., 206 Fed.
726 (1913); Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (1912); Downing Co. v. Shawmut Corp., 245 Mass. 106, 139 N. E. 525 (1923). Contra:
Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921); Foreign
Trade Banking Corp. v. Gerseta Corp., 237 N. Y. 265, 142 N. E. 607 (1923);
Jones v. Commercial Investment Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac. 896 (1924);
Motor Bankers Corp. v. Commercial Investment Trust, 258 Mich. 301, 241
N. W. 911 (1932).
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courts disagreeing as to whether the transaction is a pledge,'
agency," bailment,9 conditional sale,' 0 chattel mortgage," or an
entirely different and unique device.' 2 Accordingly, there is
similar disagreement about the necessity of recordation." As the
owner of the chattel has clothed the dealer with the indicia of
ownership, the former may be precluded by the doctrines of estoppel or apparent authority as against some innocent third party,
who has purchased the chattel in good faith. 4
Other cases uphold these agreements in the absence of
recordation, where the holder of the trust receipt secured title
from some third party,"5 but refuse to extend them to the case
where title comes direct from the debtor since the latter is in effect only a chattel mortgage. Such a distinction between the bipartite transaction and the tri-partite transaction has been approved by several writers, among them Vold,' 6 yet, as Williston
has pointed out,1 7 it is merely a distinction without a difference
7 Canal Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. New Orleans T. & M. Ry.,
supra n. 6. Hanna supports this theory in (1929) 29 COL. L. Rav. 545 at 550.
s Barry and Hoogewerff v. Boninger and Lehr, supra n. 3; Foreign Trade
Banking Corp. v. Gerseta Corp., supra n. 6.
9 G. M. A. C. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202 N. IV. 627 (1925); In re OttoJohnson Mercantile Co., supra n. 6; Hamilton Nat. Bank v. McCallum, supra
n. 6.
10 G. M. A. C. v. Mayberry, supra n. 6; White v. G. M. A. C., 2 F. Supp.
406 (1932).
11 McLeod Nash Motors v. Commercial Credit Trust, 187 Minn. 452, 246
N. W. 17 (1932); Commercial Investment Trust Corp. v. Wilson, supra n. 6;
Smith v. Commercial Credit Corp., 113 N. J. Eq. 12, 165 Atl. 637 (1933).
12 In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733 (1910) ; In re James, supra n. 3.
13 Hanna, Extension of Public Becordation (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 617.

If

law does not require recordation, an unauthorized recordation would have no
effect. G. M. A. C. v. Kline, 78 F. (2d) 618 (1935).
14 Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., supra n. 6; Jones v. Commercial
Investment Trust, supra n. 6.
"The question in
15 In re Fountain, supra n. 6; In re James, supra n. 3.
this case is how far a serviceable nag may be ridden, or, less metaphorically,
may the so-called 'trust receipt' highly useful in certain kinds of commercial transactions, and which the courts have in consequence struggled
to sustain, in spite of its apparent conflict with recording laws, be upheld
when the principal, if not the sole, reason for resorting to it is to escape
from those very statutes." In re Cullen, 282 Fed. 902 (1922).
"Trust receipts have generally been held not subject to recording or filing
acts, probably because such statutes are to prevent secret liens upon property of persons who have had prior possession and ownership of the property. And it is undoubtedly for this very reason that holders of trust receipts have been allowed to prevail against the ultimate purchaser or his
trustee in bankruptcy only where the title of the holder was derived from
some one other than the debtor." Hamilton Nat. Bank v. MeCallum, supra
n. 6.
16 Vold, loc. cit. supra n. 1.

17 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 338b. Some cases like Smith v. Commercial Credit Corp., supra n. 11, expressly reject the rule while many others
disregard it.
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STUDENT NOTES
so far as the third party is concerned. The outward appearance
and the reliance thereupon are more or less the same in each instance. At best, it is an arbitrary rule governing recovery solely
according to a secret juggling of title and, even if admitted, can
hardly be a final solution of the problem.18
In West Virginia, the law, once apparently settled, now apThe legislature had
pears just as uncertain as it is elsewhere.
amended the conditional sales act to provide that if goods were
sold under either conditional sale or trust receipt with a power
to resell, the reservation of title was void against bona fide purchasers, even despite recordation. In preparation of the 1931 code,
the code revisers struck out this provision as not properly included in the uniform act, and restored the original section.' 9
However, creditors in West Virginia are protected in some
degree by the so-called trader's act. This provides that if anyone
transacts business as a trader and sells for another without disclosing the name of his principal by a conspicuous sign at the
place of business, and without due published notice, then all the
propertjr used in the business shall be liable to the trader's creditors for all his debts.' 0 This statute has been held in Virginia to
cover the trust receipt case, 21 but it is expressly limited to creditors
and can not be construed to include purchasers."
Their position must depend on an interpretation of confusing
case law, yet surely they are as clearly entitled to absolute protection as a creditor. Both have relied upon apparent ownership
by the dealer: both have been equally deceived by the secret trust
receipt. Yet in the very same transaction a creditor is protected,
while a purchaser may possibly be defrauded. His rights are too
is The Uniform Trust Receipts Act has recently been adopted by New York
as a solution. This is of particular importance because of the great commercial activity in that state.
19 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 40, art. 3, § 9, and revisers' note.
20 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 47, art. 8, § 1, as amended by Acts of 1933.
21 Capitol Motor Corp. v. Harry M. Lasker, Inc., 138 Va. 630, 123 S. E.
376 (1924). See also Seaboard Citizens' National Bank v. Spandorfer, 100
Va. 826, 170 S. E. 12 (1933).
22Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591 (1920).
Unfortunately, "creditors" has been construed to mean "lien creditors".
Capitol Motor Corp. v. Lasker, supra n. 21; Finance & Guaranty Co. v. Oppenhimer, 276 U. S. 10, 48 S. Ct. 209 (1928). It is submitted that this is an
unnecessarily narrow construction in view of the express language of the
statute. Cf. International Trust Co. v. Webster National Bank, 258 Mass. 17,
154 N. E. 330 (1926), and Osgood Bradley Co. v. Standard Co., 259 Mass.
302, 156 N. E. 440 (1927), where bon fide pledgees from the borrower in
possession were protected against the trust receipt on the ground that the
borrower was a "factor" under the Massachusetts Factor's Act.
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important to be left in doubt, especially in view of the extensive
use of trust receipts in modern financing. There is as much reason
to prohibit secret liens here as in the case of a mortgage or conditional sale. Thus, in view of the danger involved and the previously expressed legislative intent to invalidate such secret trusts
toward bona fide purchasers, it would seem advisable to amend
the trader's act to include expressly these latter. The present
act has had an honorable existence for almost a century without
hampering legitimate business: it is believed an amendment to
protect purchasers might have an equally beneficial effect.
In other words, the trust receipt transaction has now attained
an importance which requires not only legal recognition, but legislative regulation. Granted the existence of a strong policy of the
law against secret liens, effort should be made to protect by proper
statute innocent parties whose rights might otherwise be jeopardized. Admittedly, such an act will somewhat burden the use of the
trust receipt, yet as against such a consideration there must be
offset the business security of bona fide purchasers. Apart from
this legislation, the common law can satisfactorily accommodate
itself to the modern financing method of trust receipts.
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